The Proximity-Concentration Trade-Off under Goods Price and Exchange Rate Uncertainty by Yalcin, Erdal
 
WORKING PAPER  08-3 
Erdal Yalcin  
 
The Proximity-Concentration Trade-Off under Goods Price 
and Exchange Rate Uncertainty 
 






ISBN  9788778822871 (print) 
ISBN  9788778822888 (online) 
 The Proximity-Concentration Trade-Oﬀ





The underlying model combines the proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ framework with
the real option approach. In contrast to the latest trade models, uncertainty is intro-
duced as a continuous phenomenon. Furthermore, the model contains the innovation of
comparing two option values simultaneously. The implementation of goods price uncer-
tainty turns out to reduce the probability of entering a new market as an exporter. FDI
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extended by implementing exchange rate uncertainty in a period of appreciation.
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1. Introduction
The global economic integration has been increasingly inﬂuenced by international trade and foreign
direct investments in the past two decades. According to the UNCTAD data (2006), since then
domestic companies have steadily increased their exports and foreign plant shares (horizontal FDI)
to access new markets. Besides this persistent growth, two additional striking developments can
be identiﬁed in empirical data. Since the early 1980s the growth of FDI inﬂows has exceeded that
of exports on average in every year until 2000. Within this period worldwide real GDP increased
by 2.5% and global exports rose by 5.6% per year. In contrast global inﬂows of FDI increased by
17.7% (Navaretti and Venables, 2004). The major share of FDI originated in and were attracted
by developed countries (Markusen, 2002). However, this last development has changed its nature
since 2003, as global FDI inﬂows have maintained their growth only because developing countries
have started to attract relatively more FDI inﬂows whereas developed countries have experienced a
reduction in their inﬂow growth rates (UNCTAD-Statistics, 2006).
Given the increasing importance of exports and FDI, economic analyses focusing on these two ele-
ments of international economics have gained impetus. The ﬁrst inﬂuential strand of explanation was
the Ownership, Location and Internalization Advantage framework which was developed by John
Dunning (1977, 1981). With the surge of FDI in the 1980s economists started to implement the
OLI framework into models emphasizing diﬀerent aspects of the three possible advantages. Among
them were Horstman and Markusen (1987), Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000), Brainard (1993),
Helpman (1984, 1985), Ethier and Markusen (1996) and Ehtier (1986). These models are either
static general equilibrium or static partial equilibrium models. Common to the ﬁrst four models
is the assumption of diﬀerent cost structures between export-oriented companies and multinational
enterprieses (MNE) which have been considered as the driving force behind FDI. Brainard (1993)
e.g. considers a two-country, two-sector model in which exporters are confronted with higher vari-
able costs than foreign direct investors due to transport costs. However, the domestic production
expansion for exports is associated with scale economies. Whether a company should serve a foreign
market as an exporter or via FDI therefore depends on the trade-oﬀ between scale advantages in
the domestic country and the proximity advantages in the foreign country. The author calls this
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hypothesis the proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ. In a cross-section analysis between the USA and
26 countries she provides empirical support for her hypothesis and concludes:
The proximity-concentration hypothesis predicts that ﬁrms should expand horizontally across borders
whenever the advantage of access to the destination market outweigh the advantages from production
scale economies. (Brainard, 1997)
The next inﬂuential strand of analytical models which explain export and FDI behavior, appeared
under the umbrella of the so-called New New Trade Theory, referring to monopolistic competition
models which include uncertainty over the productivity of ﬁrms that intend to enter new markets.1
Based on the seminal contribution by Melitz (2003), Helpman et al.(2004) develop a model in which
ﬁrms choose between an export and FDI mode to serve a foreign market, in the presence of the
proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ. However, in contrast to earlier models, ﬁrms don’t know their
productivity performance until they incur the costs of investment (domestic, export and FDI). Once
the companies are involved in one of the three possible investment strategies, they ﬁnally experience
their productivity. The model predicts that the most productive ﬁrms will become foreign direct
investors, less productive ones will export and the least productive ones will serve only the home
market conditional on surviving. The authors analyze U.S. exports and aﬃliate sales data based on
a Pareto distribution for ex ante uncertainty, covering 38 countries and 52 manufacturing sectors
and they are able to prove the signiﬁcance of their model.
The New New Trade Theory is a progress in international economics because it explains the involve-
ment of multinational ﬁrms in export and FDI simultaneously. Additionally, the ﬁrm heterogeneity
is combined with product uncertainty and sunk costs, elements which are observable in practice.
Furthermore, as risk and sunk costs are crucial elements in investment decisions of investors, their
implementation into the latest trade models is a major step forward. However, taking further empir-
ical literature into account which deals with export and FDI decision associated with risk, it turns
out that the speciﬁc type of risk involved is crucial for the expected outcome. Helpman et al. (2004)
consider risk as a one time shock component. Once the companies enter the markets, uncertainty
disappears. In contrast, investment models generally treat risk (a continuous phenomenon) by means
1 The term ”New New Trade Theory” has been popularized by Baldwin (2005). A concise literature overview of the
latest developments in the New New Trade Theory is presented by Helpman (2006).
2The Proximity-Concentration Trade-Oﬀ 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
of a time-dependent variable, such as volatile prices in new markets or exchange rate volatility. A
huge collection of empirical papers analyze the impact of exchange rate volatility on exports and
FDI with diﬀerent results. ´ Egert and Morales-Zumaquero (2007) analyze the impact of exchange
rate volatility on export developments in less developed countries and conclude, that an increase in
exchange rate volatility appears to depress exports. Russ (2007) shows theoretically and empirically
that FDI decisions can be inﬂuenced by exchange rate volatility signiﬁcantly.
As empirical research is pointing out the importance of additional continuous variables for the anal-
ysis of export and FDI patterns besides productivity, the development of an appropriate model
which takes both market entry modes simultaneously into account, might contribute to a better
understanding of international economic developments. McDonald and Siegel (1986) provide a ﬁ-
nancial model which combines sunk costs, volatile variables and timing to determine the optimal
investment decision of an investor through time. Their framework has become known as the real
option approach which has been extended among others by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Based on this
dynamic approach, I develop a homogeneous partial equilibrium trade model with a stochastic pro-
cess embedded into the proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ framework. In contrast to conventional
models, investors are not only confronted with the choice between exporting and FDI, but they
have also the possibility to postpone investment. The combination of the well-accepted assumptions
of the proximity-concentration hypothesis and the real option theory provides additional equilib-
rium results which can be used to explain prevailing open questions. Neary (2006) reckons that
foreign direct investments still grow faster than exports in the last years although transport costs
are decreasing signiﬁcantly. In the presented dynamic model such an equilibrium result is possible.
Decreasing exports can appear in the presence of decreasing transport costs if prices are volatile.
2. Theoretical Framework
There is one risk neutral investor who intends to serve a new foreign market with her output y. The
foreign country can either be served by exports or by a new foreign plant (horizontal FDI). The
production function for both investment choices is given by the concave Cobb-Douglas function (1)
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with labor l as the only input factor.2 Furthermore, irreversible ﬁxed costs I arise for both market
entry strategies. Therefore, the production technology provides increasing returns to scale. There is




t with 0 < θ < 1. (1)
Output prices p are given exogenously on the foreign market (price taker) and are assumed to be
certain for the moment. Labor costs w are assumed to be equal and constant in both investment
scenarios, but exports are subject to iceberg transport costs.3 The output produced in the domestic
country yD
t shrinks by the constant factor (τ − 1) if it is transferred to the foreign market and
therefore the amount yE







with τ > 1. (2)




































2 The amount of input factors can easily be extended by transforming l into a vector.
3 The transport cost technology is given by c(τ) = τ − 1.
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Clearly if transport costs increase, τ increases and as a result the optimal supply of the good
decreases. Finally, the perpetual cash ﬂow in the export scenario in each period t turns out to be
π
E












It is possible to rewrite the cash ﬂows in equation (6) with respect to total variable costs cE and cF.
Since in the FDI scenario no transport costs arise (τ = 1), total variable costs are equal to labor cost



















t with i ∈ {E,F} (7)
with the superscript F referring to FDI and E to exports. Equation (6) clearly demonstrates that
transport costs have a negative impact on export cash ﬂows, and one can conclude if labor costs are


































for i ∈ {E,F}.
The cash ﬂows in equation (9) are convex in goods prices which is a standard result if the production
function has a concave curvature.
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The proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ under certainty
The two market access modes exhibit diﬀerent relative costs. Exports are associated with ﬁxed
costs IE which include the costs for a domestic production extension and a foreign distribution and
service network. In the FDI mode, an investor is confronted with higher ﬁxed costs IF due to the
necessity of a new production plant in the foreign country but experiences lower variable costs due






Given the cost structure of the two investment modes and the perpetual cash ﬂows in equation (9),
it is possible to calculate the value v(p) of each investment mode if the opportunity cost is known. In
the underlying model, δc is assumed to be the exogenous discount rate without a deeper speciﬁcation
and it is assumed to be constant over time (δc(t) = δc).4 A switching strategy in form of becoming
ﬁrst a foreign direct investor and then an exporter is excluded. The value functions of the export
















and are depicted in ﬁgure (1) with respect to the price of the good. The crossing between the two
functions determines the equilibrium cutoﬀ price pFc at which the investor is indiﬀerent between
exporting and FDI. For prices below pEc none of the two investment strategies is worth to be started
since the cash ﬂows are not covering the ﬁxed costs and the project values are both negative. For
prices between the two cutoﬀ points pEc and pFc clearly the export solution is dominating the FDI
strategy. Due to the lower ﬁxed costs IE, the average costs are lower than in the FDI case and
therefore the investor should serve the foreign market by exports. If the price of the good exceeds
4 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a detailed discussion.
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pFc, the FDI mode becomes dominant because of the lower variable costs. Within this standard




















































F= 8,  θ = 0.6
Figure 1: Proximity-Concentration Trade-Oﬀ (Certain Case)
framework under certainty, ﬁrms should expand horizontally across borders whenever the advantage
of lower variable costs due to the lack of transport costs outweighs the advantage of lower ﬁxed costs
of a domestic production expansion. This result reﬂects the proximity-concentration hypothesis. The
diﬀerence in the relative costs of the two market access modes is the source for a diﬀerent degree
of economies of scale and shapes the ultimate choice between the two alternative entry modes as in
Helpman et al. (2004).
3. Investment Choice Under Uncertainty
Hitherto the proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ has been derived according to standard trade models
as in Brainard (1993) or Markusen (2002). These types of models don’t take into account that in the
underlying problem investors are confronted not only with an optimization problem with respect to
a diﬀerent relative cost structure but also with diﬀerent types of uncertainty over time, as e.g. goods
price or exchange rate uncertainty. From the perspective of an investor, a crucial point is the type
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of uncertainty which arises within the investment problem. In the following, I extend the standard
proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ framework by combining it with the real option theory. Two types
of price uncertainty are analyzed whereas the term uncertainty is used in an interchangeable manner
with the term risk.5 In the ﬁrst part, uncertainty is assumed in the price of the good which has
diﬀerent impacts on the export and FDI revenues. Afterwards the model is extended by introducing
exchange rate uncertainty. These two types of price uncertainties deliver diﬀerent equilibrium results.
3.1. Export or FDI under price uncertainty
In contrast to the standard proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ model, it is assumed that the price p
of the good in the foreign country follows a geometric brownian motion.
dp = αpdt + σpdz with dz = 
√
dt (13)
In equation (13), α is the expected growth rate of the price (e.g. due to macroeconomic develop-
ments). dz represents a Wiener process and is responsible for the uncertainty in the product price
p. σ is the variance parameter which is responsible for the extent of uncertainty.  is a randomly
distributed variable with the mean of zero and a standard deviation of one (standard normal distri-
bution). Therefore E(dz) = 0 and E [(dz)2] = dt.6
Within these assumptions an investor is no longer confronted with a simple investment choice be-
tween exports and FDI, based on a traditional net present value (NPV) comparison. Additionally,
the investor can postpone the investment decision by a certain period to gather further informa-
tion about the development of the uncertain variable. Clearly, gathering information by waiting is
associated with return losses since the investment is not taking place. Simultaneously, the waiting
strategy oﬀers the possibility to observe the behavior of the volatile variable and therefore the re-
spective proﬁt maximization can deliver a higher optimum. McDonald and Siegel (1986) call this
additional value which can be achieved by waiting the option value of an investment. They derive
5 In a concise way, risk is referring to a known probability distribution whereas uncertainty is referring to events in
which the numerical probabilities cannot be speciﬁed.
6 E refers to the expected value.
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an investment rule which includes the option value of a project and it turns out that the fair value of
an investment must be not only higher than its investment cost (Marshallian rule) but much higher.
For the derivation of the optimal investment rule within the proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ, it is
necessary to determine ﬁrst the expected value of the real export investment vE
u (p) and the expected
FDI value vF
u (p) under uncertainty. I refer to these values as the risk-adjusted investment values
since the price uncertainty is incorporated.
The risk-adjusted investment value
An investor who holds the real investment associated with the risk in equation (13) over a period dt
will expect a total return of µ = δ + α composed of
1. the expected appreciation of the price (α)
2. dividend (δ).
As risk is one major aspect within this valuation concept, it should be deﬁned in a more rigorous
manner. In the following, risk always refers to nondiversiﬁable risk, because with reference to the
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) diversiﬁable risk can be eliminated by constructing appropriate
portfolios. Given a market portfolio M and a riskless bond, it is possible to determine the appropriate
return for any risk rate on the considered ﬁnancial market.
Once the return for the market portfolio M’s risk rate is known, it is possible to determine the risk
premium for any ﬁrm’s asset on the market, based on the covariance or correlation between the
market portfolio M and the respective asset (Sharpe, 1964).






Equation (14) states, given the correlation coeﬃcient ρ between the market portfolio return and the
considered investment return, and given Λ (the market price of risk), the expected total return rate
of the considered asset is a sum of the riskless rate r and the respective risk premium. Consequently,
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µ represents also the risk-adjusted discount rate for cash ﬂows π(p) = Zp.7 For such a simple cash










However, in the underlying proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ framework the cash ﬂows of the two
investment modes πi(p) = Zipκ are convex in p and therefore the risk-adjusted discount rate must
be calculated by taking the convexity into account. Appendix A presents the derivation of the risk




with the risk-adjusted discount rate
δ




2κ(κ − 1). (18)
As it can be seen for a production technology with constant returns to scale (κ = 1), the risk-adjusted
discount rate δ0 is equal to the dividend payments δ of the investment. The fair value of the real
investment with a convex cash ﬂow structure (κ > 1) turns out to be risk-sensitive. Holding the
dividend payments δ constant, as assumed, an increase in the volatility σ of prices decreases the risk
adjusted discount rate δ0 and therefore increases the expected value of the investment. Technically,
this result is driven by the convexity of the underlying cash ﬂows since its expected value will become
higher according to Jensen’s inequality. Therefore, I refer to this result as the convexity-eﬀect. Given
such a structure, an investor will have a higher incentive to execute an investment the higher the
price volatility is if its option value is neglected.
7 In the underlying framework, speculative bubbles are ruled out.
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3.2. The fair value of an investment mode
Once the risk-adjusted investment values vi
u(p) of the two market entry modes are known, it is
possible to derive their fair values including the option values F i(p) respectively. One possibility to
calculate the fair value of an investment including the option value F i(p) is oﬀered by the contingent
claims valuation. This approach assumes that the ﬁnal good of a project is traded on capital markets
and F i(p) can be replicated by using the uncertain price of that ﬁnal good. Of course not every
good which is sold in foreign countries is traded on capital markets and therefore the replication
method would only be applicable to a restricted set of investments. However, even if the ﬁnal good
of a real investment is not available on capital markets, the replication method can be applied to
evaluate the fair value of the real project based on other assets or a portfolio of assets which comprise
the same risk pattern as the real investment. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) refer to this approach as
asset spanning. In the underlying problem, the value of the two projects (export and FDI) are risky
because their value v depends on a stochastic variable p. Therefore, the diﬀusion process behind the
value v could be derived from the volatile prices p by using the mentioned methods. As a result, the
option value F(v(p)) of the two projects could be determined. However, this nested approach turns
out to deliver very complicated results. Therefore, a third alternative is used here which results in
the same investment rules as the replication and asset spanning method.
A riskless portfolio Θ is constructed by
1. holding one unit of the option F(p)
2. going short n units of an asset, which comprises the same risk return pattern as equation (13)
→ asset spanning: n = F 0(p)8
3. the short position will require a payment of δF 0(p)p for each period dt.
A crucial assumption about the asset which is used to span the risk of the real investment is, that it
pays no dividend. In other words, its expected return is given by µ and results only from its capital
gain. Since this constructed portfolio Θ is riskless, its return must be equal to a riskless return
8 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 118) for an analytical prove, that n = F0(p) is the optimal short position.
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0(p)pdt = r[F(p) − F
0(p)]dt. (19)














The result for the option value F(p) is a second order diﬀerential equation which is linear in its






00(p) + (r − δ)pF
0(p) − rF(p) = 0.9 (21)


































σ2 < 0. (24)
Appendix B presents the derivation of β and appendix C derives its properties. Based on equation
(22), it is possible to formulate conditions to determine the constants A1, A2 and the threshold value
p∗, which triggers the real investment.
The ﬁrst condition is given by
F(0) = 0. (25)
It simply states that the option F(p) should be worthless if the price of the underlying asset is equal
to zero. Since β2 is negative, condition (25) can only be true if A2 = 0. As a result, the guess
9 The eﬀect of Ft(p) is neglected since in the underlying continious case dt approaches zero.
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solutions for equation (22) is reduced to
F(p) = Ap
β. (26)
Two additional conditions are necessary to determine the trigger price p∗ and the parameter A.
These conditions are derived by considering the option value F(p) at the threshold price p∗. First




∗) − I (27)
Equation (27) is referred to as the matching condition. Additionally, for optimality the derivative




Equation (28) is referred to as the smooth-pasting condition or higher-order contact (Dixit, 1993). If
the two functions were not smooth at the trigger price p∗, a better maximum would be available. By
using these conditions, it is possible to determine the cutoﬀ prices and the three option parameters
Ai and β for the underlying uncertain investment modes at which the option value of the project is










































for i ∈ {E,F}
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Appendix D provides a concise derivation of the value p∗. The corresponding investment rule for









If the volatility σ of the goods price p increases, the parameter β decreases (
∂β
∂σ < 0).10 Simultane-
ously,
β
β−κ increases and shifts up the threshold price p∗. The same eﬀect drives up the expected
investment value vi
u(p∗).
As it can be seen, the demanded real investment value is much higher than the investment costs Ii
since the wedge
β
β−κ is bigger than one. In other words, an investor who includes the option value
F i(p∗) in her assessment will demand a higher price of the good if its volatility σ increases. This is
a standard result in the real option framework. Since the eﬀect can be explained by observing σ, I
refer to this result as the uncertainty-eﬀect.
It is easier to interpret the economic intuition behind equation (32) if a numerical example is pre-
sented. Assume that the investment costs of a project are I = 1 with a volatility of the price
σ = 0.2. The riskless interest rate is r = 0.05 and δ = 0.05. The exponent of the production func-
tion is θ = 0.3. With these parameter values β = 2.16, and the investment rule states v∗
u = 2.96 I.
Therefore, the underlying risky investment should be executed if its value is at least 2.96 times
higher than the corresponding costs I, which is a huge diﬀerence to the Marshallian rule according
to which an investment should be put into eﬀect if the value of the project covers the investment
costs I. Depicting the value function vE
u (p) of the export mode with its option value F E(p) allows
to present the derived eﬀects. In ﬁgure (2), the price level pEc represents the cutoﬀ price under
certainty which was derived in ﬁgure (1). Under certainty the investor should expand her domestic
output for exports if prices are higher than pEc. The introduction of goods price uncertainty and
the possibility of postponing an investment decision have two eﬀects which are inﬂuencing the cutoﬀ
price, namely the convexity and uncertainty-eﬀect. In ﬁgure (2) the continuous line represents the
expected value of the export strategy. Due to the convexity-eﬀect, the value function vE
u (p) is shifted
up as the price of the good is volatile over time. In a scenario where the option value F E(p) of the
10Appendix C derives conditions which constrain β.
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E=12, δ= 0.1, σ = 0.2,  θ = 0.6, r = 0.04
Figure 2: Cutoﬀ price pEu for exports under uncertainty
investment is neglected, the investor would become an exporter if the prices are higher than pE.
The dashed line represents the option value of the export strategy and according to the optimality
conditions the export cutoﬀ price results if F E(p) is tangent to the expected investment value vE
u (p).
This is the case at the price level pEu. The diﬀerence between the two functions F E(p) and vE
u (p)
can be interpreted as the value of waiting. As long as the two functions don’t coincide, there is a
positive value of waiting and the investment should be postponed. Obviously, the uncertainty-eﬀect
shifts up the cutoﬀ price of the export strategy and increases the value of waiting. Therefore, a
risk-neutral investor will postpone the investment as long as the market price is lower than the
cutoﬀ price pEu. The crucial result in ﬁgure (2) is that the uncertainty-eﬀect is bigger than the
convexity-eﬀect. Therefore, uncertainty leads to an investment which takes place at higher prices
and implicitly later than under certainty. An independent presentation of the FDI mode in a graph
is not necessary as the eﬀects are the same as in ﬁgure (2). The only diﬀerence lies in the degree
of convexity of the two value functions and the level of the equilibrium cutoﬀ price which is higher
due to the higher ﬁxed costs.
Finally, it is possible to analyze the investment strategy of a risk-neutral investor who has to choose
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between the export and FDI modes including the option values of each strategy. Figure (3) depicts
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Figure 3: Export or FDI under uncertainty (A)
the value functions vi
u(p) of the two investment modes including the ﬁxed costs for speciﬁc param-
eter values as continuous lines. The corresponding option values are represented by the dashed
lines F E(p) and F F(p). Given the exemplary cost structure, the resulting cutoﬀ prices provide the
following investment plan. If the price p is smaller than pE, the investor should wait and neither
of the two investment strategies is executed, since the option values of both investments are higher
than their expected values vi
u(p). For prices between pE and pF the investor would be willed to exe-
cute the export investment since its matching and smooth pasting conditions are fulﬁlled. However,
within this price range the upper envelope in the graph is represented by the option value of the
FDI mode. Therefore, the investor should wait and observe the price development. The economic
intuition behind this price range is as follows. By waiting, the investor has the chance to observe the
market and gather additional information concerning the FDI strategy. Given the price volatility in
p, the FDI strategy oﬀers a potentially higher return than the export strategy and therefore waiting
is rational.11
11Such a strategy excludes strategic interaction between ﬁrms. It is assumed that there is no disadvantage if a ﬁrm
enters a country later.
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Generally spoken, the optimal strategy is derived by taking two conditions into account. First the
investor has to compare the two cutoﬀ prices and determine whether the prevailing market price is
below or above them (necessary condition). However, such a comparison is not suﬃcient to identify
the optimal strategy. Additionally the investor has to check the upper envelope of the value func-
tions in ﬁgure (3) and control for, whether at the analyzed price level the upper envelope is given by
an option value or not (suﬃcient condition). At a price level of p1 in ﬁgure (3) e.g. exporting would
be a proﬁtable mode for an investor since p1 > pE. However, taking additionally the FDI mode into
account it turns out that given the brownian motion (13) it is optimal to wait for the FDI mode as
the upper envelope at p1 is represented by its option value.
The resulting investment rule within the proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ framework diﬀers from
the standard option value models where the investment should be executed as soon as the price of
an investment lies above the cutoﬀ price. In the underlying framework, the investor has not only to
control for the respective option value but also for the option value of the alternative investment.
Figure (4) presents the value functions of the two investment modes with their option values at
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Figure 4: Export or FDI under uncertainty (B)
diﬀerent relative ﬁxed and variable costs, keeping the remaining parameters unchanged. The export
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mode represents the dominant strategy for any price level since the upper envelope is either repre-
sented by the option value F E(p) or by the FDI value function vE
u (p).
Since the optimal strategy is derived from the upper envelope in ﬁgure (4) and since this envelope
changes with diﬀerent relative costs of the two investment modes, a crucial question is, whether it
is possible to deﬁne unique optimal investment rules within the proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ
framework with respect to the price volatility σ and the relative cost structure.
The necessary and suﬃcient condition of the optimal investment
As explained, the investor will choose the optimal investment mode by taking two conditions into














Under which condition the cutoﬀ price pE is bigger or smaller than pF can be analyzed by considering












Relation (34) shows that the cutoﬀ price pE will always be higher (lower) than pF if the comparative
advantage of the export strategy in ﬁxed costs is lower (higher) than the comparative advantage
of the FDI strategy in variable costs independently of the price volatility described by equation
(13). This is a remarkable result because the proportional relationship between the two stochas-
tic equilibrium cutoﬀ prices is determined only by the deterministic relative costs although each
of the equilibrium prices depends on the stochastic goods price. Figure (5) represents the relative
ﬁxed and variable costs of the two investment strategies within the proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ
framework. Since the ﬁxed costs for exporting are assumed to be lower than in the FDI mode, the
upper level of the relative ﬁxed costs is equal to unity. Given the assumed variable cost relationship
between the two modes, the relative upper margin also equals to unity. The diagonal curve in ﬁgure
(5) represents states in which the relative ﬁxed costs are equal to the relative variable costs of the
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Figure 5: The optimal investment mode under uncertainty
two modes. According to condition 1, for such relative cost relationships the equilibrium cutoﬀ
prices are equal (pE = pF). Any relative cost structure above the diagonal curve provides a cutoﬀ
price for FDI which lies below the cutoﬀ price of the export mode (pE > pF), independently of the
degree of volatility σ of goods prices. The cutoﬀ price for exports will be lower than the optimal FDI
price for relative cost structures below the diagonal (pE < pF). The cross in ﬁgure (5) represents a
speciﬁc relative cost structure for the two modes and an investor can immediately derive according
to condition 1 that the export cutoﬀ price will be lower than the FDI cutoﬀ price. By comparing
the prevailing market price with the two cutoﬀ prices, it is possible to determine whether the value
of waiting for each of the two investments is positive. If e.g. the market price is at a level of pE
as in ﬁgure (3), the investor would be willed to start exporting. However, the export mode would
not be the optimal investment choice at that price level because the alternative mode’s option value
represents the upper envelope. By comparing the option values of the two investment modes, it is
possible to determine the upper envelope in ﬁgure (3) for a price range in which both investment
modes still possess a value of waiting.








The option value of the export mode will be below (above) the option value of FDI if
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for i ∈ {E,F}. (37)
Setting the two option values F F(p) and F E(p) relative to each other provides
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Condition 2 is almost identical to condition 1 except the diﬀerence in the relative ﬁxed costs on the
right-hand side which turns out to be risk-sensitive since β includes the price volatility σ. For a
price volatility equal to zero, the two conditions are identical because β approaches inﬁnity. If the
right-hand side in condition 2 equals the left hand-side, an investor is indiﬀerent between the two
modes, because the value of waiting in both modes is equal. An increase in the price volatility σ
decreases β. As a result, a higher market price volatility increases the range in which the option
value of exporting is smaller than the option value of FDI. The economic intuition of this causality
is that a higher price volatility increases the value of waiting for FDI in a higher extent than for
exporting. In such a case, the upper envelope in ﬁgure (3) is predominantly covered by the option
function of the FDI mode.
The diagonal continuous curve in ﬁgure (5) represents states at which the relative variabel costs of
the two modes are equal to their relative ﬁxed cost ratio if the price volatility is close to zero (σ ≈ 0).
For relative cost structures which are above the continuous line, the option value of FDI will always
be higher than the option value of the export mode. The investor should always wait for the FDI
investment as it is representing the upper envelope in ﬁgure (3). For relative cost structures in the
lower right corner, the option value of exporting will be higher than the option value of FDI. In such
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a case, the upper envelope in ﬁgure (3) will be represented by the export mode. The dashed line
in ﬁgure (5) represents states at which the two option values are equal to each other with a price
volatility σ = 0.12. Obviously, within the proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ framework an increase
in the price volatility extends the range in which the option value of FDI is always higher than the
option value of the export case. Although both investment modes are confronted with the same price
volatility σ, the increase of the value of waiting for the FDI mode turns out to be always higher than
the increase in the value of waiting for exporting. The area between the dashed and the continuous
curves represents the diﬀerence in the value of waiting for the two modes if σ increases.
By taking into account condition 1 and 2 simultaneously it is possible to derive the optimal choice
of an investor between the export mode and the FDI mode.
In ﬁgure (5) area A represents relative cost structures of the two modes which always result in a
lower cutoﬀ price pF of the FDI mode and simultaneously a lower option value of the export mode.
Therefore, in area A FDI will always be the optimal investment mode independently of the degree of
price volatility as condition 1 and condition 2 reach their upper margin at the diagonal continuous
curve.
For any relative cost structure in area C the export mode always turns out to be the optimal
investment strategy because its cutoﬀ price pE will always be lower than the FDI cutoﬀ price and
simultaneously its option value at pE will be always higher than the option value of FDI. This result
only holds under the assumption that goods prices develop according to the geometric brownian
motion (13) and the initial price at t1 is below all cutoﬀ prices.12 As explained earlier, an increase in
σ extends the region in which the option value of FDI becomes dominant and if σ = 0, the dashed
line coincides with the diagonal continuous curve. This can be seen in ﬁgure (5). As σ increases,
the dashed line becomes more convex and reduces area C.
The last area which needs to be analyzed is region B in which the cutoﬀ price of the export mode
will be always smaller than the cutoﬀ price of the FDI mode. Simultaneously, the option value F F
will always dominate the option value of exporting. Figure (3) presents such a scenario in which
pE < pF and F F > F E. However, it is necessary to proof that the option value of FDI will be always
12One could imagine to draw prices from a distribution without a motion, but such an approach is not in accord with
the real option approach and must be modelled in a diﬀerent way.
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the upper envelope between pE and pF if F F(pE) > F E(pE). At a price level pE, the investor is
willed to execute the export mode but will wait, given the value of waiting for the alternative mode.
The investor will always wait for the FDI mode if its option value F F is not crossed by the value
function vE
u of the export mode between pE and pF as in ﬁgure (3).
If the slope of the FDI option value in pE is higher than the slope of the export value function
and if simultaneously F F
p (pE) increases faster than vE
up(pE), then the option value of the FDI mode
will be always the upper envelope in ﬁgure (3). This causality holds due to the strict monotonicity
(convexity) of the four functions. Therefore, area B in ﬁgure (5) would represent unambiguous cost
structures for which FDI is the optimal investment mode.
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up(pE) smooth pasting condition. (40)
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Inequality (43) is equal to condition 2, for the case in which the option value of FDI is higher than
the option value of exporting. It states that for relative cost structures which fulﬁll condition 2, the
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option value of FDI always will be the upper envelope in ﬁgure (3) and the value function of export-
ing will never cross the option value of FDI. This holds for any price p bigger than pE. Therefore,
area B in ﬁgure (5) turns out to represent relative cost structures which will always lead to FDI.
This is a remarkable result because according to the analysis so far, it is suﬃcient to compare the
two option values to determine the optimal investment strategy based on the relative cost structure
and the prevailing price volatility σ.
Result
Assuming (10) holds and the investor starts to observe the goods prices at a price level below the cut-
oﬀ prices, then the export mode will be the optimal investment strategy if and only if F E(p) > F F(p).
The FDI mode will be the optimal strategy to serve the foreign market if and only if F E(p) < F F(p)
regardless of the relationship between pE and pF.
Proof: See in the text .
Introducing uncertainty in goods prices as a geometric brownian motion and giving an investor
the possibility of postponing an investment changes the predictions of the proximity-concentration
trade-oﬀ framework compared with a scenario under certainty. Indeed, an increase in the volatility
of goods prices decreases the probability of executing both types of investment, because higher cut-
oﬀ prices do result. This is a known result from the standard real-option theory. However, in the
underlying framework an increase in the goods price volatility not only decreases the probability of
executing both investments but furthermore, leads to a situation in which the share of FDI with
respect to the export mode increases. Relative cost structures which favor the export mode under
certainty, are leading to FDI under goods price uncertainty. Diﬀerently expressed, an increase in
goods price volatility increases an investor’s expected entry price. As the FDI mode delivers higher
proﬁts than the export mode at high prices, an increase in goods price volatility promotes predom-
inantly the FDI mode to serve the foreign market.
Comparative statics
Transport costs τ, the goods price volatility σ and the exponent θ of the production function are of
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Transport Costs τ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
Goods Price Volatility σ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
Degree of Concavity θ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
Relative Fixed Costs IE
IF ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
Relative Variable Costs (cF
cE)
θ
1−θ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑
Table 1: Comparative Statics
Transport costs have been introduced as iceberg costs and are inﬂuencing only the variable costs of
the export mode. An increase in τ is directly increasing the variable costs cE. There is no impact
on the variable cost of the FDI mode. In ﬁgure (5) and in condition (2), it can be seen that an
increase of the transport costs is changing the relative cost ratio of the two modes in such a way,
that exporting becomes less attractive for an investor.
An increase in θ (with 0 < θ < 1) reduces the concavity of the production function in l. Simulta-
neously, the cash-ﬂow function π(p) becomes more convex in p. Since the variable costs of the FDI
mode are lower than in the export case, the convexity of the FDI cash-ﬂows is higher, and a rise in
θ increases the convexity of πF(p) more than for πE(p). Therefore, a rise in θ increases area B in
ﬁgure (5) and promotes the FDI mode for a bigger relative cost range.
An increase in the price volatility σ increases the convexity of the indiﬀerence curve in ﬁgure (5).
The range of relative costs which is favoring the FDI mode (area B) increases in σ. This result can
also be derived from condition (2). As σ increases, β decreases and the relative cost range which
favors FDI increases.
Besides these parameter eﬀects, ﬁgure (5) also shows that for relative cost structures with relative
high (low) variable costs in the foreign country and relative low (high) ﬁxed costs in the home
country, exporting (FDI) is the optimal investment strategy.
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3.3. The timing of export and FDI under uncertainty
A convenient aspect of the real option approach is the fact that the cutoﬀ prices are described by
parameters without any reference to the probability distribution of the Wiener process in equation
(13). However, this convenience appears with the cost of losing the time variable of the model.
Based on the cutoﬀ prices, it is possible to identify the optimal investment strategy but it is not
possible to derive the timing of the corresponding investment given a speciﬁc geometric brownian
motion. By running a Monte-Carlo simulation, it is possible to derive probability distributions for
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Figure 6: The timing of FDI (A)
the timing of the two investment modes for speciﬁc parameters. Figure (6) shows a sample path for
the expected investment values of the export and FDI strategies vi(p) − Ii and the corresponding
option values F i(p). The changes of the goods price over time are measured monthly and are given
by the transformed geometric brownian motion
pt = pt−1 (1 +
α
12





The chosen relative costs of the two investment modes are representing a relationship which is falling
into area B in ﬁgure (5). Therefore, the FDI mode should always be the optimal strategy. Indeed,
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in ﬁgure (6) the upper function at any time t is either represented by the FDI option value F F(p)
or the investment value function vF(p) − IF. After 19 months, an investor would be willed to serve
the foreign market as an exporter, since there is no value of waiting for the export mode in that
month. But taking into account the FDI mode, the investor should wait further 5 months and
become a foreign direct investor. Clearly, the refusal of the export mode (gathering information)
is associated with potential return losses between the 19th and 24th months. However, the waiting
strategy turns out to be optimal as the FDI returns always are higher than the export returns and
on the long run the initial losses are recovered. Figure (7) shows an alternative sample path for the
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Figure 7: The timing of FDI (B)
diﬀerent investment modes with the same parameters as in ﬁgure (6). As it can be seen, given the
stochastic behavior of the goods price, the resulting sample paths can diﬀer heavily from each other.
Furthermore, the extent of waiting will be diﬀerent in each sample path of the simulation.
3.4. Simulation results
The average time of waiting ti
opt for the optimal investment mode is determined by a Monte-Carlo
simulation for a speciﬁc price volatility σj. Based on the the geometric brownian motion (44), a
price vector with t = 120 elements is generated (investment horizon of 10 years). In accordance
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with the presented theory, the cutoﬀ prices are calculated and the optimal investment mode is
determined. The process is repeated n=100000 times and ﬁnishes with the calculation of the average
time of waiting for the optimal strategy. The whole procedure is nested into a second simulation
which repeats the determination of the average value of waiting for the whole range of deﬁned price
volatilities σ, holding the remaining parameters constant (ceteris paribus). Figure (8) depicts the
structure of the simulation.
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Figure 8: The structure of the simulation
The chosen parameter values represent a relative cost relationship between the two investment modes
which lies in area C in ﬁgure (5). Figure (9) presents the distribution of chosen strategies within the
”n” diﬀerent paths for each deﬁned σ. As the price volatility increases, the probability of becoming
an investor decreases and the probability of neglecting both investments monotonically increases.
For the volatility range 0.02 < σ < 0.13, the only investment mode which is taken into account
turns out to be exporting. At a price volatility of σ = 0.14 suddenly FDI becomes the optimal
investment mode and keeps on staying. This binary result is consistent with the previous theoretical
results where the choice between the two investment modes has been identiﬁed unambiguously. The
simulation provides the additional information that an increasing goods price volatility decreases
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the probability of starting any of the two investment modes. Figure (10) shows that FDI always
takes place after a time, at which exporting would have been as such proﬁtable. There is no case
in which FDI takes place while exporting is not proﬁtable (FDI immediately realized). This is also
a predicted result of the model. Within the FDI mode samples, the majority of the investments
would be executed after the considered investment horizon of 10 years. If the investment decision
was constrained to this time range, the share of the FDI mode would be even lower.13
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F = 2.2, r= 0.04, δ = 0.04, θ = 0.4, T = 120, α = 0.03, n = 100000
Furthermore, ﬁgure (10) shows that the share of the FDI mode which takes place within the time
range of 10 years, increases with rising volatility. This phenomenon can be explained by the ﬁrst
passage time for geometric brownian motions (Song et al., 2002; Pattillo, 1998; Abel, 1983). As the
price volatility increases, the state variable tends to reach its deﬁned boundary faster. Figure (11)
shows that the ﬁrst passage time increases in the case of export, as the price volatility increases.
However, for higher price volatilities the average waiting time turns out to decrease, which is the
case in the FDI mode. In other words an increase in σ increases the value of waiting for exporting, as
predicted implicitly by the theoretical model. For the FDI mode, a higher price volatility leads to a
higher cutoﬀ price but not necessarily to a higher average value of waiting. Figure (12) presents the
average time of the FDI modes which appear only within the 10-year investment horizon. Clearly,
the average time of the observed state variable decreases in σ.
13Although the simulation only considers a time range of t=120, it is possible to determine the optimal investment time
for the corresponding FDI paths and include it into the analysis.
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Tangency Cond. for Export fulfilled
According to the simulation, an increase of the goods price volatility σ has 4 crucial eﬀects:
1. The probability of any investment decreases (standard real option result)
2. The probability of serving the market by FDI (export) increases (decreases) (predicted by the
model)
3. The value of waiting increases in the export mode (market is observed longer)
4. FDI takes place earlier (ﬁrst passage time phenomenon).
4. The Choice under Exchange Rate Uncertainty
A crucial type of continuous risk besides goods price uncertainty is represented by exchange rate
volatility. Multinational companies which intend to serve a new foreign market have to take into
account the development of the exchange rate especially if the destination country has a ﬂoating
currency system. Repatriated proﬁts from foreign countries may be inﬂuenced delicately if a strong
exchange rate depreciation appears. On the other hand, an appreciation may increase the value of
repatriated proﬁts although the foreign demand has not changed. From a theoretical point of view,
the impact of the exchange rate volatility on revenues and therefore on the investment choice is not
unambiguous. Empirical literature in international trade has tried to shed light on this theoretical
puzzle. A large quantity of studies deliver conﬂicting results concerning the impact of exchange rate
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volatility either for FDI or for export behavior (Russ, 2007; ´ Egert and Morales-Zumaquero, 2007).
Theoretical models which take the standard real option approach into account generally suggest
a negative eﬀect of exchange rate volatility on FDI or export decisions (Campa, 1993). Based on
this literature strand, empirical models also suggest a negative impact of exchange rate ﬂuctuation
on FDI (B´ enassy-Qu´ er´ e et al., 2001). However, the choice between exporting and FDI within the
proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ framework under exchange rate uncertainty is not available so far.
In the following, I extend the formulated model by combining it with exchange rate volatility. Given
the lack of theoretical models which analyze the impact of a foreign exchange rate appreciation
(Greenaway and Kneller, 2007), I present a case in which an investor needs to choose between
exporting and FDI in a period of exchange rate appreciation.
4.1. The modiﬁed model structure under certainty
The assumptions of section 2 are modiﬁed in the following manner. The goods price on the foreign
market is still exogenous but no longer uncertain. There is an exchange rate between the investor’s




with p as the price in domestic currency and p∗ as the price measured in foreign currency.14 The
proﬁts in the foreign market are supposed to be repatriated, and therefore the investor chooses the
market entry mode by comparing the FDI and export investment values, measured in the domestic
currency. Since in the export mode output y is produced in the home country, only the revenues are
inﬂuenced by the exchange rate, whereas in the FDI mode the variable costs (productions costs) are





























t et − wt et lt s.t. yt = lt
θ. (47)
14The described scenario could be interpreted as a ﬁxed exchange rate system.
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F = wt. (49)
For a given constant discount rate δc and a relative cost structure according to the assumptions of the



























for i ∈ {E,F} (52)
The ﬁxed costs Ii are paid una tantum and priced in the domestic currency (no exchange rate
eﬀect).15 The two investment modes show diﬀerent curvatures with respect to e. The value of











∂e2 = 0. (54)
The over-proportional increase of the export ﬁrm value arises from the fact that an appreciation of
the exchange rate has a positive impact on the revenue side but no impact on factor prices, since
production costs incur in the home country. On the other hand, the FDI value increases with an
appreciating exchange rate at a constant rate because besides the revenues production costs also
15In the FDI mode, one can imagine that the machineries are acquired in the home country or paid directly from the
home country.
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increase. Figure (13) depicts the value function for the export mode (vE(e)1 − IE
1 , vE(e)2 − IE
2 )
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Figure 13: The impact of the exchange rate
within the proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ framework
with two diﬀerent ﬁxed costs IE
1 > IE
2 for speciﬁc exchange rates at a given goods price. The
FDI value function is represented by the linear dashed line vF(e). Due to the diﬀerent variable
costs in the two entry modes, their slopes diﬀer from each other whereas the level of their value
functions is determined by the ﬁxed costs. Comparing the export mode vE(e)2 − IE
2 with the FDI
mode at an exchange rate e0 = 1 (no exchange rate eﬀect) demonstrates that at the given relative
cost structure, the FDI mode would be the optimal entry strategy, because it provides the highest
proﬁts.16 Furthermore, it can be seen that the marginal proﬁts vE0(e) for the export mode are
increasing in e whereas in the FDI mode they are constant. A comparison of the two value functions
vF(e) − IF and vE(e)1 − IE
1 provides a unique cutoﬀ exchange rate eE. For higher exchange rates,
exporting is preferable. For any exchange rate below this cutoﬀ value, FDI will be the optimal
investment strategy between eF and eE. If the exchange rate is lower than eF, none of the entry
modes is executed. Comparing the export mode vE(e)2 − IE
2 with the FDI mode results in the two
cutoﬀ exchange rates e1 and e2. The ﬁrst cutoﬀ exchange rate e1 results from the very low ﬁxed
16As IE
1 > IE
2 , FDI will dominate exporting in the other case, too.
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costs in the export mode. Although the FDI mode exhibits an advantage in variable costs at that
exchange rate level (vF0(e) > vE0(e)), the relatively low ﬁxed costs are promoting the export mode
for rates between e1 and e3 (ﬁxed cost eﬀect). At an exchange rate e1, the FDI mode’s variable
cost advantage oﬀsets the export strategy’s ﬁxed cost advantage and for exchange rates bigger than
e1 FDI becomes optimal. At an exchange rate e∗ the marginal proﬁts of the two modes are equal
(vE0(e) = vF0(e)). For any exchange rate above e∗ the variable cost advantage of the FDI mode is
reduced by the exchange rate appreciation (exchange rate eﬀect), since the factor costs of the export
mode are not inﬂuenced. Finally, at a rate e2, the exchange rate eﬀect oﬀsets the variable cost
advantage of the FDI mode and exporting becomes optimal for e > e2. For the given relative cost
structure in ﬁgure (13), the FDI mode turns out to be optimal for exchange rates between e1 and
e2 if it is compared with vE
2 (e) − IE
2 . For an appreciation of the exchange rate by more than 40%,
exporting becomes the optimal entry mode.
Exchange rates turn out to inﬂuence the choice of an investor’s entry mode diﬀerently than goods
prices even without the introduction of uncertainty.
4.2. FDI or export under exchange rate uncertainty
In the following, the model is modiﬁed by assuming that the exchange rate follows a geometric
brownian motion with
de = α e dt + σ e dz with dz = 
√
dt. (55)
The foreign country is assumed to be in a period of economic recovery, in which the exchange rate
is appreciating. Therefore α represents the positive expected appreciation trend. dz represents
a Wiener process and is responsible for the uncertainty. σ is the variance parameter which is
responsible for the extent of uncertainty.  is a randomly distributed variable with the mean of
zero and a standard deviation of one (standard normal distribution). Therefore E(dz) = 0 and
E [(dz)2] = dt.17 The investor will observe the market (waiting strategy) and choose between
exporting and FDI, depending on the exchange rate. The exchange rate volatility σ has an impact on
the expected export investment value, because of the convexity of the function (Jensen’s inequality).
17E refers to the expected value.
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2η(η − 1). (56)
An increase in the volatility reduces the risk-adjusted discount rate δ0
e and therefore increases the
expected returns in the export mode. If the option value of the investment is neglected, an investor
would enter a foreign market with high exchange rate volatility at low exchange rates (convexity
eﬀect). The expected value of the FDI mode under exchange rate uncertainty is not inﬂuenced as it
is linear in e (no convexity eﬀect). The corresponding option values F E(e) for the export mode and















































σ2 > 1. (61)
Figure (14) depicts the investment value functions and the option value functions. At an exchange
rate volatility of σ = 0.1, the expected export investment value becomes proﬁtable for exchange
rates higher than eF
u. Due to the convexity eﬀect, this rate is lower than the corresponding exchange
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Figure 14: Export or FDI under exchange rate uncertainty (A)
rate eF
c under certainty. However, if the export option value is taken into account, the investor will
invest for rates higher than eE∗ (uncertainty eﬀect). For any exchange rate smaller than eE∗, there
is a positive value of waiting and the export decision is postponed. In the FDI mode, there is no
convexity eﬀect and as in the certain case the investment turns out to be proﬁtable for exchange rates
bigger than eF
0 . However, taking the corresponding option value F F(e) into account, the investor
will observe the market as long as the exchange rate is below eF∗, due to the uncertainty eﬀect. The







(γ − η)KE and e
F∗ =
γ δ IF
(γ − 1)KF . (62)
The optimal entry mode is determined by choosing the upper envelope in ﬁgure (14) at the prevailing
exchange rates. In contrast to the price uncertainty case, there is not a unique upper envelope
function. For exchange rates eF∗ < e < eE
1 , the FDI mode represents the optimal entry mode
whereas for exchange rates above eE
1 exporting becomes the optimal choice.
The economic intuition is as follows. For a low exchange rate volatility σ, FDI will be the optimal
35The Proximity-Concentration Trade-Oﬀ 4 EXCHANGE RATE UNCERTAINTY
entry mode if the ﬁxed costs in the export mode are not too low relative to the FDI ﬁxed costs
and simultaneously if the variable costs cF are not too high relative to cE. For low ﬁxed cost in the
export mode, the upper envelope in ﬁgure (14) is always represented by the export mode (F E(e) or
vE(e) − IE). Figure (15) represents the value function for the two modes at the same parameter
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Figure 15: Export or FDI under exchange rate uncertainty (B)
values as in ﬁgure (14) except the exchange rate volatility σ. An increase in the exchange rate
by only 3% simpliﬁes the choices of the investor, since the upper envelope in the ﬁgure is merely
represented by the export mode functions. Therefore exporting becomes the only optimal entry
mode.
The increase in the exchange rate volatility has an asymmetric impact on the two entry modes. The
convexity eﬀect does not appear in the FDI strategy. As a consequence, the value of waiting in the
export mode increases faster than in the FDI mode, and in ﬁgure (15) the range of exchange rates
which promote exporting increases. In contrast to goods price uncertainty, within the proximity-
concentration trade-oﬀ framework an increase in exchange rate uncertainty promotes exporting.18
18The result is referring to a scenario in which the foreign country experiences an exchange rate appreciation.
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5. Conclusion
Multinational enterprises’ choice between exporting and serving a foreign market through an aﬃliate
plant has been explained predominantly by the proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ framework within
international economics. Based on the assumption of asymmetric cost structures, the framework
provides results which are empirically signiﬁcant (Brainard, 1997; Helpman et al. 2004). Still,
certain empirical patterns cannot be explained to a satisfying extent within this framework. Neary
(2006) points out that transport costs have decreased steadily in the last years and contrary to
the proximity concentration hypothesis the number of foreign aﬃliate ﬁrms has grown much faster
than the number of exporting companies. One possible explanation for this ambiguous result is the
negligence of continuous risk within the investment choice of multinational ﬁrms. Decision makers
are confronted with goods price and exchange rate uncertainty and will anticipate and implement
these aspects into their ﬁnal choices. Real option models constitute a theoretical tool for this
purpose. They are increasingly applied in corporations and should be therefore taken into account
in prevailing models. Indeed, the underlying combination of the proximity concentration trade-oﬀ
framework with commonly accepted real option assumptions turns out to revert the equilibrium
results of standard trade models if goods price uncertainty is taken into account. The presence of
volatile goods prices promotes FDI as the optimal strategy to serve a new foreign market. Price
risk turns out to be a counteracting force e.g. to decreasing transport costs. Referring to Neary’s
empirical puzzle, one possible reason for increasing FDI in the presence of decreasing transport costs
may lie in the presence of volatile goods prices. Given the increasing importance of emerging markets
(UNCTAD-Statistics, 2006) which exhibit higher volatile environments and which simultaneously
contribute to the increase in global FDI, the presented theoretical results contain a reasonable
rational. Additionally, the extended model demonstrates that diﬀerent types of price uncertainty
have fundamentally diﬀerent eﬀects. In contrast to goods price uncertainty, exchange rate volatility
turns out to promote primarily exporting. Furthermore, the presented model oﬀers the possibility
to determine the average timing of market entry in the presence of price risk. Given the lack of
appropriate ﬁrm level data, the empirical veriﬁcation is disposed to future research.
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Appendix
A. Risk-adjusted value of an investment
For an uncertain price:
dp = αpdt + σpdz (63)
Cash ﬂows in each period are given by:
π(p) = Zp
κ (64)
Valuation by spanning a riskless portfolio:
￿ holding a unit of the investment project with value v(p) over dt
￿ short position of n = v0(p) units of output over dt

































Rearranging equation (65) and substituting dv provides:
dv(p) − v
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As the spanned portfolio is riskless ⇒ it must provide the riskless return r in each period dt:
r[v(p) − v
0(p)p]dt (72)








2)dt = r[v(p) − v
0(p)p]dt (73)
⇒ π(p) + v










The risk-adjusted value of v(p) in equation (74)
Since the second order diﬀerential equation (21) is linear in the dependent variable v(p) and its
derivatives
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00(p) = κ(κ − 1)Z1p
κ−2 (79)







κ−1(r − δ)p − rZ1p
κ + Zp





2κ(κ − 1) + κ(r − δ) − r)Z1p
κ + Zp




r − κ(r − δ) − 1
2σ2κ(κ − 1)
(82)




with the risk-adjusted discount rate
δ




2κ(κ − 1) (84)
B. Solution of a homogeneous diﬀerential equation






00(p) + (r − δ)pF
0(p) − rF(p) = 0
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it is possible to state a general guess solution of the form
F(p) = Ap
β (85)
since the diﬀerential equation is linear in the dependent variable F. Substituting the guess solution





β + (r − δ)βAp
β − rAp




2β(β − 1) + (r − δ)β − r = 0. (87)













σ2 = 0. (88)






























σ2 < 0. (90)




However, due to the ﬁrst optimality condition
F(0) = 0 (92)
the second solution with β < 0 can be neglected. Otherwise the condition is not fulﬁlled.
The total diﬀerential of the fundamental quadratic equation Ψ delivers some important comparative
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results.
As the volatility σ increases, β1 will decrease. This has an important impact on the wedge in equation
(32), since
β
β−κ will increase and therefore the expected trigger value of the investment will increase,
too.
C. The fundamental quadratic equation





2β(β − 1) + β(r − δ) − r = 0 (93)






Figure 16: The fundamental quadratic equation
For the underlying value function v(p), it is required that
δ
0 > 0 with δ




2κ(κ − 1) (94)
otherwise v(p) approaches inﬁnity or is negative (economic intuition does not make sense).
As it can be seen, δ0 is simply the negative of the fundamental quadratic Ψ. Therefore, the require-
ment δ0 > 0 is equivalent to the condition Ψ(β) < 0.
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Figure (16) demonstrates, that the fundamental quadratic is negative for betas between β1 and β2.
Therefore, it can be concluded that for δ0 > 0 it must be κ < β1
As κ = 1





Furthermore, the production function is deﬁned for
0 < θ < 1. (96)
And therefore κ > 0.
Under these conditions δ0 > 0 for β1 > κ > 0.
D. The threshold price p∗
Given the optimality conditions









the cutoﬀ price p∗ which determines the investment threshold can be calculated as follows. Solving
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